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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALICE FARX\YORTH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CHRIS JEXSEX, AL~[A .JENSEN 
and S\\ ... EX ( ~. JENSEN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
7378 
Brief of Respondents 
STATEl\fENTS OF FACTS 
Defendants have examined the appellant's state-
ment and accept as hereinafter specifically noted, said 
statement is a fair and concise presentation of the facts 
in this case. 
On Page 4 of appellant's brief, first paragraph, ap-
pellant states: ''The defendants wholly failed to make or 
tender the payment of the purchase price as specified in 
the contract.'' With this assertion we take issue. Tender 
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was made by the defendants in their answer to the first 
suit filed June, 1938. See Exhibit "2", file in Case No. 
2379. Tender was also made by the defendants of the 
sum of $5,200.00, balance of principal plus interest at 
6 per cent per annum on said balance from April1, 1948, 
when the amount of outstanding liens and encumbrances 
on the 263 acres had been determined, plus $656.30 with 
interest thereon from May 15, 1939, at 6 per cent per 
annum, plus $400.00 with interest thereon at 6 per cent 
per annum from May 15, 1943, plus $598.37 with interest 
from May 15, 1948, plus interest at 6 per cent per annum 
on said sums from on or prior to l\Iay 1, 1949. This 
tender still remains available to plaintiff when appel-
lant tenders a warranty deed to defendants; hence, it 
is manifest that the statement of the appellant charging 
that the defendants have ,,·holly failed to make or tender 
the purchase price is not supported by the facts. See 
answer of the defendants dated November 20, 1948. True, 
if appellant's contention of what the contract of the par-
ties specifies is correct as a matter of law, then the 
tender of the defendants fails to abide by the terms of the 
contract, but the sole issue which now divides the liti-
gants revolves about what the contract requires by way 
of tender under all the facts and circumstances of the 
case as set forth by the appellant, with which defendants 
are .in agreement and accord except as herein set forth. 
Appellant assigns five errors in the conclusions of 
law and the decree of the court entered thereon. These 
errors are all addressed and directed to the sole issue in-
volved upon this appeal; namely, when under the terms 
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and conditions of the contract and the conduct of the 
appellant were the defendants obligated to pay or tender 
the balance of the principal, to wit: the $5,200.001 Ap-
pellant insists that nothing in the conduct of the appel-
lant relating to her efforts to c.lear the title of the bond 
liens against the land in quesEon relieYed the defendants 
of making the installment payments of principal as 
specified in the contract. The trial court found the liens 
to be in excess of the balance of principal specified in the 
contract and concluded until the total amount of such 
liens had been fixed and determined th~ defendants were 
not called upon to make further payments of principal 
or interest under their contract. Both parties remained 
in possession of the respective properties exchanged 
under the contract in the interim when appellant was 
acting to clear the liens. 
The appellant has considered all errors and treated 
them together as one and the defendants have chosen to 
do likewise for as stated above we see but a single point 
involved, viz: were the defendants entitled under their 
contract as a matter of law to suspend paYillents of prin-
cipal and interest until appellant had legally determined 
the total amount of the liens and encumbrances outstand-
ing against the property~ 
ARGUMENT 
We agree with counsel for appellant that no factual 
dispute is presented by this appeal. At the outset appel-
lant brushes aside the consideration of Exhibit '' 2'' 
(Tr. 87), to wit: the entire file in Case No. 2379, which 
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represents litigation between these parties wherein 
appellant sought to have the contract in question de-
clared forfeited because defendants had paid nothing 
thereon except the $300.00 paid November 10, 1936. Ap-
pellant asserts the decision of the trial Judge, Hon. 
Lester A. Wade, now a member of this court, has no bear-
ing whatever inthis case at this time. While this appeal 
does not stem from the decision in Case No. 2379, we 
think the file has considerable significance to the deter-
mination of this appeal. The pleadings of the parties and 
the findings, conclusions and decision rendered thereon 
in that case supply a historical background to the case 
now before this court which definitely and materially 
aided the trial Judge, Hon. John l\L Hendricks, in the 
determination of the issues presented in Case No. 3708 
from which this appeal is taken. In the first case the 
action was brought by appellant in April1938 about two-
and-a-half years after the contract was made. The trial 
court found the defendants (the buyers) to be in violation 
of the strict terms of this contract for failure to pay the 
installments of interest and principal as specified, but 
also found the seller in default for not diligently acting 
to determine and remove the liens as provided by the 
contract. In that decision from which the seller took 
no appeal the court pointed the way for the seller to bring 
the contract into good standing and obligate the buyer 
to make the principal payments as specified. The court 
declared the contract required the seller to bring a 
suit or suits to determine the amount of and remove the 
liens of the drainage bonds within a reasonable time. 
The trial Judge declared a reasonable period for the 
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completion of such action or actions to be six months 
from the date of the contract. Notwithstanding this deci-
sion the record shows proceedings to determine the liens 
and the extents thereof were not effectuated in the lower 
court until almost fiYe years thereafter and then another 
four years elapsed before the matter was finally deter-
mined hy this conrt. 
Consequently, we contend that Exhibit "2" afore-
said, to wit: File X o. 2379, should be examined closely 
and ghTen the consideration accorded same by the honor-
able Trial Judge who took up the story of the case from 
where the former trial Judge left the parties. We be-
lie';e the findings and conclusions of the trial court in the 
case at bar are amply supported by the evidence and the 
judgment rendered thereon the correct solution of 
the case. 
AUTHORITIES 
Let us first address ourselves to the authorities pre-
sented by the Appellant-We have examined Foxley vs. 
Rich, 35 rt. 162, 99 Pac. 666, which as far as we are able 
to ascertain has Yery little, if any, application to the 
ease at bar. Without briefing the case, we are content 
to agree with Appellant that in a case of the type pre-
sented, we may feel constrained, without committing-our-
selves, that under the facts presented in that case, the 
Vendor's conduct in conveying the property to a third 
party did not relieve the Vendee of making his payments 
as specified in his contract. The fact remains that the 
ease is not applicable to this case. In parting, the litigants 
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here did not stipulate what the result of a breach would 
be, hence, the italics of the Appellant's brief at the top 
of Page 14 do not and could not possibly have any force 
or· effect in the instant case. 
Cases cited by Counsel in support of Foxley vs. 
Rich have no more application to the case at bar than the 
primary case, hence, we shall not waste effort here re-
sponding to same. 
We come now to Appellant's citation, 27 R. C. 1., 
Para. 271. We respectfully submit the cited authority 
has greater value to us than to the Appellant in the light 
of the facts involved, for if the contract in the instant 
case had been carried out as contemplated by the plain 
and unequivocable terms thereof the long period between 
the date of the contract and the determination of the 
amountof the liens would not have happened and the 
parties would have long since met their respective respon-
sibilities under their contract. 
In answer to Levine, et aL, vs. Whitehouse, et a1., 37 
Utah 360, 109 Pace. 2., we say, simply, ,that the case can-
not possibly apply here. The final determination of the 
litigation between the Appellant and the Drainage Dis-
trict was absolutely necessary to apprise the Respond-
ents of the amount they would be required to tender to the 
Appellant-manifestly, a tender by the Respondents be-
fore such a determination would be an idle gesture. 
Responding to Appellant's citation of Empire In-
vestment Co., vs. Mort. (Cal.), 153 P. 236, we are at a 
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loss to understand in what possible way that case applies 
to the case at bar. There were precedent duties to be 
performed by the Appellant Farnworth before the Re-
spondents could be expected to perform their obligations 
under the contract. This is particulraly true in the light 
of the fact that the outstanding liens substantially ex-
ceeded the balanre owing in the contract price of the 
property. 
In respons'-' to Leafgreen Y. LaBar cited by Appel-
lant on Page 17 of her brief, the Respondents are con-
tent to say that if the case was in point as to the facts, we 
would still agree with the principle announced but the 
facts do not square with the case here and consequenly 
the announced principle is inapplicable. 
Our answer to Miller vs. Jones, cited on Page 18 of 
Appellant's brief is that the facts in the Case before this 
Court do not lend themselves to the principle declared 
therein. The possession of the Defendant has no bearing 
on the point at issue. The Respondent buyers had no 
means of knowing how much to tender to the seller until 
the litigation involving the matter had been finally deter-
mined. Speculation as to the amount to be tendered 
would have been a futile gesture of performance to avoid 
the running of interest. 
Finally, in answer, to authorities cited by the Ap-
pellant, ·we come to Jensen vs. Liehinstein, 45 Utah 320, 
145 Pac. 1036, Page 19 of the brief. The facts of that case 
are not controlling here. The contract in the case at bar 
positively required the determination of the amount of 
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outstanding liens. ThH nature of the liens required the 
institution of litigation, the outcome of which was highly 
speculative-Moreover, the Appellant was in possession 
of the property exchanged by the Respondents under the 
contract throughout the period of the litigation involving 
said liens, and should not be heard to complain of Re-
spondent's possession of the land here involved pending 
the uncertainty of the litigation required to settle the 
question of outstanding liens. 
In support of their contention that the judgment of 
the trial court should be sustained, the respondents sub-
mit the following authorities: 
"If the failure to make payment of the prin-
cipal debt is due to any improper act or omis-
sion of the creditor, or to such conduct on his 
part as prevents the debtor from complying with 
his contract to pay, interest on such debt is gener-
ally suspended during the time the debtor is so 
prevented from making payment. 
See Corpus Juris, Vol. 33, Page 239, Sec-
tion 139, and cases cited in the footnotes. 
"Where it is the creditor's duty to ascertain 
the amount due to him by his debtor, interest will 
not be allowed to him in advance of such ascertain-
ment.'' 
See Corpus ,Juris, Vol. 33, Page 240, Sec-
tion 141. 
The foregoing authorities are cited for the reason 
that in the instant case the appellant undertook to clear 
the title to the land in question of certain liens, the amount 
and extent of which were uncer, a in. Hepresentatiolls 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
were made that such liens amonnted to the sum of 
$5,000.00 and the respondents ag-reed to mortgage the 
property to secure this amount and apply the proceeds 
to the payment of the liens as the amounts were ascer-
taiiled. It later developed that the liens actually amount-
ed to $6,800.00 and the court found that the appellant was 
guilty of laches in not pursuing the necessary litigation 
to determine the amount of such liens. 
''In an executory contract for the sale of 
land where the purchase price is payable in in-
stallments, the vendor must show that he has good 
title to the land before he can recover any install-
ment of the price.'' 
Graves YS. ~Iason, 2 Alta. L. 179 
Graves ,.s. ~[ason, 1 Alta. L. 250 
The reasons for this rule as stated in the cited au-
thority, which is also supported by other cases found in 
the footnote, 66 Corpus Juris, Page 1381, Section 1404, 
are particularly applicable to the case at bar. 
''It would be extremely mischievous to hold 
that where the purchase money is to be paid by 
installments, and when it is paid the estate is to 
be conveyed, the purchaser could be eompelled to 
pay all his purchase money without having a good 
title she,,·n, and without the estate being discharg-
ed from incumbrances. The result would be in 
nine cases out of ten that when the purchase 
money had been all paid and spent, the vendor 
would be unable to shew a good title or discharge 
the incumbrances and the purchaser would be in 
an unfortunate condition." 
Gamble vs. Gumerson, 9 Grant Ch. ( Ont.) 
193,200 
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See also, Thompson, vs. Brunskill, 7 Grant Ch. ( Ont.) 
542, 547, where in a case such as the one before us the 
court reasoned as follows ; 
"It appears to me that upon such a contract 
a purchaser is not bound to pay one shilling of the 
purchase money, or interest, unless a good title is 
shewn; and that he stands upon the same footing 
in that respect as if the whole purchase money 
were payable in hand. To hold otherwise would 
indeed work great wrong in many cases. In most 
contracts for the sale of land, when time is given 
for payment, the purchase money is made payable 
by instalments. To hold that the purchaser is 
bound to go on year after year, making his pay-
ment, perhaps a title of the whole before he can 
demand that a good title be shown, would be a 
practical negation of his ordinary equity to have 
a good title shown, before he parts with his pur-
chase money; and to leave him to his personal 
remedy against the vendor would often be a 
remedy only in name.'' 
In 27 R. C. L., Page 537, under Section 271, the 
following rule appears : 
"Unless it is otherwise stipulated in the con-
tract, the unpaid purchase money does not draw 
interest before the stipulated time for its payment 
though the purchaser is given possession.'' 
Lofland vs. Maull, 1 Del. Ch. 359 12 Am. 
Dec. 106; 
Bouthemy vs. Ducournau, 6 :Mart, 0. S. 
(La.) 657, 12 Am. Dec. 486 
True, the contract in the instant case provided for 
interest on deferred installments of principal, but it 
must be noted that these installments of principal were 
to be applied toward the liquidation of outstanding liens. 
10 
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When the respondents learned that the appellant was 
making no efferot to determine the amount of the liens 
against the propt>rty and had fnilc·d to apply monPy paid 
in discharge of liens as per contract tlH•y determinPd to 
suspend payments until the appellant showed some effort 
to determine the amount of the outstanding liens. Mani-
festly, had the appellant commenced suit -within a reason-
able time after the execution of the contract to determine 
the amount of the liens, there ·would have been no excuse 
for the respondents to suspend the payment of purchase 
money as specified in the contract. But, upon the reason-
ing of the case above cited equity would not compel the 
purchaser to go on year after year paying the $500.00 an-
nual installment with interest while the appellant was 
sitting idly by making no effort to reduce the amount 
of outstainding liens to a certainty. Moreover, as shown 
hereinabove, respondents learned that the amount of the 
lif~ns substantially exceeded the $5,000.00 agreed upon in 
the contract. 
In 30 American Juris prudence, at Page 42, Section 
!")2, appears the following rule: 
"Where a debtor is really and bona fide ready 
to make payment and intends to do so, but is pre-
vented from doing so by the act or omission of his 
creditor, the latter will not be entitled to interest. 
A tender by the debtor of theamount of his debt, 
if made in the proper manner, will suspend the 
running of interest on the debt from the time of 
snrh tender.'' 
Hart vs. Brand, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 
159 10 Am. Dec. 715 
See also Shannon vs. Freeman, 117 SC 480 
109 SE 406 
11 
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There is nothing in the record to show that the 
respondents were not bona fide ready to make the pay-
ments provided in the contract and had the appellant not 
negligently allowed the time to run respondents would 
have had no complaint about the interest payments pro-
vided. Respondents were not in a position to make a 
tender because of the uncertainty of the amount neees-. 
sary. However, when the amount of the liens had been 
determined by the final decision of the Supreme Court, 
respondents then made their tender, except interest on 
deferred installments between 1936 and 1948. The tender 
as made is still available to the appellant and in the 
custody of the clerk of the court in Davis County. 
Failure or Refusal of Vend or to Cure Defect. 
55 Am. Jurisprudence, Page 720, Sec. 275. 
"If the title of the vendor is defective and he 
makes no effort to cure the defect in his title, but, 
on the contrary, relies upon adverse possession, 
he cannot subsequently successfully claim he was 
not given a reasonable time in which to comply 
with his contract. Moreover, when the vendor 
wrongfully demands that the vendee accept a title 
which is not good, and brings an action to enforee 
forfeiture for the failure of the vendee to accept 
the title, any right which the vendor may have 
had, under other circumstances to an additional 
time in which to perfect defects in his title is 
lost.'' Anno. A. L. R. 1520. 
Sorensen vs. Larue ( 1926) 43 Idaho 292, 252 Pac. 494. 
In this case the vendor sought to effect a forfeiture 
o fthe contract ,although he had failed to present good 
title as called for by his contract. 'rhe court denied the 
12 
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relief but likewise denied the Yendee l'l'seission of the con-
tract on his cross-complaint. On appeal the Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court denying rescission to the 
vendee, and ruling that the vendor by his wrongful eon-
duct in bringing the suit to forfeit \\'hen his title was not 
good foreclosed his right to any additional time to per-
fect his title. 
This principle seems to be in aeeord with good con-
science, equity and justice. As applied to the case at 
bar, the vendees vYould have been wholly justified in re-
scinding their contract when the vendor brought the 
action in June, 1938, to forfeit the contract. They then 
chose to make a tender of the $500.00 installment which 
had not been paid and asked the court to require the 
vendor to apply the money against outstanding liens. The 
court denied the vendor's prayer for forfeiture and 
ordered the deed to the land restored to the clerk of the 
court to await further action of the vendor in curing the 
defects in the title. 
The vendor cries injustice and inequity because the 
trial court in the present action denied interest while she 
took ten years to clear defects of which she had full know-
ledge at the time she made her contract. Injustice cer-
taily would have been done the vendes had the court re-
quired vendees to pay interest during the years the 
vendor took her own sweet time to clear the liens. Then, 
too, we must not overlook the fact that the bulk of the 
purchase price had already been paid in the exchange of 
properties. 
13 
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We respectfully submit the judgment of the lower 
court should be affirmed and costs herein awarded to 
respondents. 
E. LEROY SHIELDS, 
GROVER A. GILES 
Attorneys for Defenda;nts 
a;nd Respondents. 
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